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Given that the assumption of perfect rationality is rarely met in the real world, we explore
a graded notion of rationality in socioecological systems of networked actors. We parametrize
an actors’ rationality via their place in a social network and quantify system rationality via the
average Jensen-Shannon divergence between the games Nash and logit quantal response equilibria.
Previous work has argued that scale-free topologies maximize a system’s overall rationality in this
setup. Here we show that while, for certain games, it is true that increasing degree heterogeneity
of complex networks enhances rationality, rationality-optimal configurations are not scale-free. For
the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt games, we provide analytic arguments complemented by
numerical optimization experiments to demonstrate that core-periphery networks composed of a
few dominant hub nodes surrounded by a periphery of very low degree nodes give strikingly smaller
overall deviations from rationality than scale-free networks. Similarly, for the Battle of the Sexes
and the Matching Pennies games, we find that the optimal network structure is also a core-periphery
graph but with a smaller difference in the average degrees of the core and the periphery. These results
provide insight on the interplay between the topological structure of socioecological systems and their
collective cognitive behavior, with potential applications to understanding wealth inequality and the
structural features of the network of global corporate control.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory has been a popular tool for modelling de-
cision making scenarios, with applications that vary from
understanding economic market forces [1], to evolution-
ary biology [2], to political science and considerations of
warfare [3]. The identification of equilibrium states is
a primary concern in the field, a key notion being that
of Nash equilibria [4], which represent fully rational out-
comes in strategy selection. Nevertheless, actors in the
real world deviate from rational behaviour [5].
As a consequence, extended notions of equilibrium are
needed to deal with the discrepancies between real and
perfectly rational behaviour, and to precisely quantify
such bounded rationality. One alternative equilibrium
concept is the notion of quantal response equilibrium
(QRE), which is given by statistical reaction functions
that satisfy certain monotony properties with respect to
the payoffs of possible strategies [6, p. 10]. One possible
class of parametric class of functions, which relate to the
study of individual choice behaviour [7], define the logit
quantal response equilibrium (LQRE). In LQRE a ra-
tionality parameter is used to interpolate between Nash
equilibria and a uniform distribution over all the possible
strategies [6]. An early use of LQRE was to account for
experimentally observed behaviour in choosing strategies
when playing the Matching Pennies game [6, 8]. Since
∗ sr10g13@soton.ac.uk
then, the LQRE has found applications in the traditional
areas of game theory, including auction theory [9], partic-
ipation games, e.g., voting [10, 11], and theories of social
learning [12, 13]. Here, we will make use of the LQRE in
conjuncture with network theory.
Games on networks have had a rich history, with early
research started by considering propagation of strategic
behaviour in spatial settings, e.g, on lattices by consid-
ering the Prisoner’s Dilemma [14] or, recently, the more
general case of potential games [15]. In recent times, evo-
lutionary games on networks have been a topic of growing
interest, see, e.g., [16, 17] for reviews.
Topology can have a significant effect on equilibria
of the system, e.g., scale-free networks have been found
to promote cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, pro-
vided that pairwise imitation is used with the probability
of imitation proportional to the difference in total payoffs
[18]. Other research has investigated the coevolution of
internal states and topological features of networks where
players are able to modify the structure by rewiring links,
leading to a highly cooperative stationary state [19], or,
if cooperation is to be maintained as a viable strategy
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma then the network tends to ac-
quire an exponential degree distribution [20].
Also investigating the topological evolution of net-
works, the authors of [21] account for the fact that in-
dividuals are known to be influenced and biased by their
social connections and thus consider LQREs for games
played between agents connected via a social network.
As more highly connected players are assumed to be in
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2a better position to gather information, the rationality
of players is modelled as an increasing function of node
degree. The network structure is then optimised to min-
imise the overall deviation from perfect rationality (i.e.,
the Nash equilibrium), and the general result arrived at
by [21] is that scale-free networks realise an optimum.
Furthermore, the scale-free topology seems to emerge
independently of the games considered by [21]. Since
then, the framework and results of [21] have been used in
problems relating to internet routing [22] and optimising
influence in social networks [23]. Here, we argue that the
optimal topology to maximise rational behaviour among
all players depends on the games under consideration,
and in no case does it correspond to a scale-free network.
Below we show that for the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
the Stag Hunt games the optimum topology is a core-
periphery network, where the core consists of a low num-
ber of high degree hubs and the periphery is made up of
many low degree nodes. For the Battle of the Sexes and
Matching Pennies games, the optimum topology is also
of core-periphery type, but there are differences in the
number of hubs, as well as in the average degree of the
nodes in the core and in the periphery. In all cases we
provide analytic treatment and perform computational
experiments to support our claims. In Section II we out-
line our methodology, which is closely aligned to that of
[21]. In Section III we present results, with Subsection
III A containing the treatment of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
and Stag Hunt games and Subsection III B dealing with
the Battles of the Sexes and Matching pennies. Section
IV concludes the paper.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium
Game P2
P1
u111, u
2
11 u
1
12, u
2
12
u121, u
2
21 u
1
22, u
2
22
TABLE I. Payoffs in the general form of two-person game.
In this section we briefly revisit the framework of [21].
Parameter choices and the nature of the equilibria we
analyse in the rest of the paper are closely aligned with
[21] to facilitate comparison. Given a network, every
node i is assigned a rationality λi = f(di) which is a
function of the nodes’ degree di. The rationality func-
tion is an increasing function of the degree, which implies
that higher degree nodes have higher rationality. We con-
sider the cases in which the function f is: linear, where
f(d) = rd and r = 0.2, convex, where f(d) = rd2 and
r = 0.002 or concave, where f(d) = r
√
d and r = 0.5.
A two-person game is played on every edge of the net-
work, where the nodes represent the players and links
denote the games. The payoffs for any two person game
can be written as in Table I. We will be considering
games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma and we are inter-
ested in determining the Logit Quantal Response Equi-
librium (LQRE) of the games, rather than their Nash
equilibrium. Each edge has two players, labeled 1 and
2, with rationality λ1 and λ2, respectively. We con-
sider mixed strategies, where each player has two avail-
able pure strategies, labeled cooperation and defection.
Player 1 cooperates with probability p1c and defects with
probability 1 − p1c , and similarly for player 2. Follow-
ing [6] the LQRE is determined by solving the system of
equations
p1c =
eλ1(p
2
cu
1
11+(1−p2c)u112)
eλ1(p
2
cu
1
11+(1−p2c)u112) + eλ1(p2cu121+(1−p2c)u122)
p2c =
eλ2(p
1
cu
2
11+(1−p1c)u221)
eλ2(p
1
cu
2
11+(1−p1c)u121) + eλ2(p2cu212+(1−p2c)u222)
(1)
Alternatively, Eq.’s (1) can be written as:
p1c(1 + a1b
p2c
1 ) = 1
p2c(1 + a2b
p1c
2 ) = 1
(2)
where
a1 = exp(λ1(u
1
22 − u112))
b1 = exp(λ1(u
1
12 + u
1
21 − u111 − u122))
a2 = exp(λ2(u
2
22 − u221))
b2 = exp(λ2(u
2
12 + u
2
21 − u211 − u222))
(3)
Eq. (2) will be helpful when solving for different games.
In case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, if λ1, λ2 → ∞, then
p1c , p
2
c → 0, which corresponds to the Nash equilibrium,
i.e., a rational outcome. For an edge k we write the
probability distribution associated to player 1 as P 1k =
(p1c , 1−p1c), and likewise for player 2. We write Q1, Q2 for
the probability distribution of the Nash equilibrium for
players 1 and 2, respectively. For the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Q1 = Q2 = (0, 1), i.e., the rational outcome in which no
cooperation occurs.
We want to quantify the extent to which the players
on the network play rationally. For this, we measure
the average Jensen-Shannon divergence from the Nash
equilibrium over the edges:
− ρ = 1
M
M∑
k=1
Div(P 1k ||Q1) +Div(P 2k ||Q2), (4)
where
Div(P ||Q) = 1
2
(∑
i
P (i) ln
P (i)
R(i)
+
∑
i
Q(i) ln
Q(i)
R(i)
)
(5)
3(a) (b)
FIG. 1. Illustrative example of a core-periphery topology
that minimises the average divergence (while avoiding isolated
nodes) in the case of the: (a) Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag
hunt games, where the hubs form a complete subgraph and
each has a high degree and (b) Battle of the Sexes, where the
hubs for a regular subgraph. For the Matching Pennies the
optimal topology is similar to (b) but the periphery consists
of isolated K2 graphs.
is the Jensen-Shannon divergence and R = (P +Q)/2
is the average of the probability distributions P and Q
and M is the number of edges in the network. We refer
to −ρ as the average Nash-LQRE divergence and to ρ as
the system rationality.
B. Optimisation algorithm
What is the network topology that maximises the sys-
tem rationality as measured by ρ or, equivalently, min-
imises −ρ? This is the question [21] posed, and the au-
thors of [21] also suggested that scale-free graphs realise
the optimum. More specifically, [21] showed that scale-
free graphs have lower −ρ than random graphs with the
same number of nodes and edges. Furthermore, an op-
timisation procedure that rewired a random graph to
minimise −ρ gave rise to a network with a degree dis-
tribution that fitted a power-law with a R2 correlation
of 90%. There are at least two weaknesses in the ar-
gument: firstly, the optimisation run by [21] does not
indicate convergence to a minimum, i.e., no plateau is
visibly reached and secondly, checking through linear re-
gression that the degree distribution fits a power-law is
a poor test to verify that a scale-free topology is present,
and it is more robust to perform linear regression on the
rank distribution [24].
In the next section we propose an alternative topol-
ogy that minimises −ρ, and give computational and an-
alytic support for this. To numerically obtain a network
with minimum −ρ we consider the following numerical
scheme. The scheme, which is similar to other optimisa-
tion schemes previously employed in the context of path-
length optimisation [25] or optimal synchronisation [26]
essentially implements a random hillclimber. Start from
a random graph and repeat the following operations:
1. Randomly select a node A, and one of its neighbors
B.
2. The edge that links from A to B is rewired to con-
nect A and a randomly selected node C which is not
a neighbour of A. If we wish to prevent the appear-
ance of isolated nodes, then we do not rewire away
from nodes of degree one, i.e., we require d(B) > 1
when selecting B.
3. We calculate the divergence on each edge, accord-
ing to (5), in the new neighborhood of C and sum
them. We compare this sum to the analogous sum
computed for the old neighborhood of B.
4. If there is a decrease in the value of the sum, the
rewiring is kept. Otherwise, the original position
of the edge is restored and the entire procedure is
repeated.
5. If we allow isolated nodes to form during the opti-
misation, then we regularly remove them and ran-
domly rewire the links between the remaining nodes
(akin to simulated annealing). Afterwards, the op-
timisation proceeds as above.
The above algorithm implies that, after a re-wiring, the
rationalities of a node and its neighbours are updated si-
multaneously. Note that, once a node becomes isolated,
it will never reconnect to the rest of network through the
hill-climbing part of the optimisation. This is because
a zero degree node will always increase the average di-
vergence if reconnected to the rest of graph through an
edge.
In the following section we reproduce the results of
[21] for random and scale-free networks, and also con-
sider two additional topologies, regular random graphs
and what we refer to as core-periphery networks. The
core-periphery network we explore can be described as
having a bipartite subgraph, but, in addition, the high
degree nodes, i.e., hubs, form a regular (or even com-
plete) subgraph. See Fig. 1 for a illustration of the types
of core-periphery networks we find when maximising sys-
tem rationality.
III. RESULTS
We analyse four games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the
Stag Hunt, the Battle of the Sexes and the Matching Pen-
nies game. The network topologies we investigate are:
core-periphery, scale-free networks, regular and Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi random graphs. The scale-free networks are gen-
erated using preferential attachment, according to the
Baraba´si-Albert model [27]. Tables II and IV show the
average divergence in the case of the four games on net-
works that have N = 1000 nodes and M = 2000 edges.
The results for the random and scale-free graphs are
averaged over 100 instances, and likewise for the core-
periphery topology in the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
and Stag Hunt games. The ‘game parameter’ is set to
β = 1.33. The choice of games, network parameters and
4Game with
β = 1.33
Prisoner’s Dilemma Stag Hunt
Graph type
Core-periphery (K = 13)
Scale-free Random Regular
Core-periphery (K = 18)
Scale-free Random Regular
Computed Analytic Computed Analytic
Linear 0.2149(2) 0.2135 0.361(2) 0.3914(3) 0.3982 0.1532(6) 0.1485 0.337(7) 0.311(1) 0.3377
Convex 0.2112(2) 0.2108 0.407(4) 0.4290(1) 0.4300 0.1988(1) 0.1983 0.395(4) 0.4263(1) 0.4286
Concave 0.3082(1) 0.2890 0.377(1) 0.3876(2) 0.3907 0.2435(5) 0.3817 0.284(3) 0.2930(7) 0.3067
TABLE II. The average Nash-LQRE divergence (−ρ) in the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt games for the
different network topologies and rationality functions. The numerical results for the core-periphery, scale-free and random
networks are averaged over 100 instances. The core-periphery nodes have K hubs.
PD P1 SH P1
P2
1, 1 0, β
P2
β, β 0, 1
β, 0 0, 0 1, 0 0, 0
TABLE III. Payoffs for the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and Stag
Hunt (SH) games.
β parameter are again consistent with [21]. We devi-
ate from [21] by considering a more common form of the
Matching Pennies that is employed in experimental se-
tups [8]. In the case of the asymmetric games, namely
the Battles of the Sexes and Matching Pennies, the game
on each edge is played twice with players interchanging
roles. This amounts to solving equations (1) once with
rationalities (λ1, λ2) and once with (λ2, λ1), and then
taking the average of the two divergences.
A. Symmetric games
1. Prisoner’s Dilemma
Our results for the Prisoner’s Dilemma on random
networks closely match with [21], while the results for
scale-free networks are consistent but show a larger de-
crease than reported in [21] compared to the random
case, see Table II. Next we consider rationality-optimised
networks. Figure 2(a) shows the evolution of the diver-
gence during optimisation. The numerical computations
indicate that the topology of the random graph is evolv-
ing towards a core-periphery graph with a complete sub-
graph of K = 13 hubs, cf. Fig. 1 for a qualitative visual-
isation. To complement these simulations with analytic
arguments we approximate the solutions to equations (1).
The network obtained through the optimisation proce-
dure has a divergence within 2% of the analytic estimate,
as Fig. 2(a) shows. The core-periphery networks that
were generated to compute the entries in Table II have a
divergence that deviates less than 0.5% from the analytic
estimate (in the case of linear rationality). Hence, the
difference between the numerical result and the analytic
estimate in Fig. 2(a) likely stems from the optimisation
getting stuck in a local optimum. Selective re-wirings of
a few edges could further reduce the divergence but the
global network topology would still be of core-periphery
type with K = 13 hubs.
The payoffs for the Prisoner’s Dilemma are shown
in Table III. In this case we have that a1 = 1, b1 =
eλ1(β−1), a2 = 1, b2 = eλ2(β−1) and equations (1) take
the form:
p1c(1 + e
λ1(β−1)p2c) = 1
p2c(1 + e
λ2(β−1)p1c) = 1
(6)
We can obtain analytic results for regular graphs in
which all players are characterised by the same rational-
ity. Let pr be the probability of cooperation on a regular
graph. Then, in the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, pr
satisfies the equation:
pr(1 + e
λ(β−1)pr ) = 1, (7)
where λ is the rationality of a node. The divergence −ρr
for a regular graph with N nodes and M edges is thus
given by:
− ρr = pr ln 2 + (1− pr) ln 1− pr
1− pr/2 + ln
1
1− pr/2 . (8)
The results of applying equation (8) for the different
rationality functions match precisely with the entries for
regular random graphs in Table II. The degree distribu-
tion for the random graph has an average and mode of
〈d〉 = 4, and we see that results for the random and
regular topologies are close (within 2%), i.e., the regular
random graph can be seen as a zero order approximation
of the random graph.
Analytic results are also possible for the core-periphery
graph, where the core consists of hubs with high degree
(high rationality) and the periphery contains nodes of
low degree (low rationality). Let ph be the probability of
cooperation for a hub and pf the same quantity but for
a periphery (fringe) node. For the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
the equations ph and pf satisfy are
ph(1 + e
λhpf (β−1)) = 1
pf (1 + e
λfph(β−1)) = 1
(9)
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FIG. 2. (a) The evolution of −ρ, the average Jensen-Shannon divergence between Nash and LQR equilibria, for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (β = 1.33) with linear rationality, of an initially random network (N = 1000 nodes and M = 2000 edges) as a function
of attempted edge rewirings, while not allowing isolated nodes. The optimisation gets within 2% of the estimated minimum
(dashed line). (b) The divergence of a core-periphery graph with N = 1000,M = 2000 as a function of the number of hubs
according to numerical calculations (dots) and analytic estimates (dashed line) using equation (12) for core-periphery graphs.
where λh and λf are the rationalities of the two types
of nodes. If λf > 0 and λh  1, then ph ' 0 and this
implies that pf = 0.5. So, we can approximate the prob-
ability of cooperation of a periphery node with a hub to
zero order by p
(0)
f = 1/2 , while hubs do not cooperate,
i.e., p
(0)
h = 0. The contribution of the edges between the
high connectivity nodes in a core-periphery graph leaves
the divergence -ρ largely unchanged, because the hubs
are highly rational (due to their large degree). The diver-
gence of a connected core-periphery graph with a finite
number of hubs but infinite number of periphery nodes is
thus given by µ = 3/4 ln 4/3 = 0.216, independent of the
choice of rationality function is long as it is an increasing
function of the degree.
For a more accurate picture we consider first order cor-
rections and obtain
ph =
1
1 + eλh(β−1)/2
' e−λh(β−1)/2 = p(1)h
pf =
1
1 + eλf (β−1)p1c
' 1
2(1 + λf (β − 1)p1c/2)
' 1
2
− λf (β − 1)p
1
c
4
= p
(0)
f + p
(1)
f
(10)
In a core-periphery network with K hubs each each
hub has degree M/K + K − 1 and the periphery nodes
have average degree d that satisfies
K(K − 1)
2
+ d(N −K) = M. (11)
If the hubs are of high enough degree such that the first
order corrections p
(1)
h , p
(1)
f are small, then the divergence
-ρ of the core-periphery graph with N nodes and K hubs
can be approximated as follows:
−ρcp '
(
1− K(K − 1)
2M
)(
µ+
p
(1)
h ln 2 + p
(1)
f ln 3
2
)
− K(K − 1)
2M
ρc,
(12)
where −ρc is the average divergence over the edges be-
tween the hubs, which form a complete subgraph. The
average divergence of the core-periphery network with
K = 13 hubs for linear rationality is −ρcp = 0.2135.
This result is close but slightly lower than the numeri-
cally computed entries in Table II. As one would expect,
the approximation is better for the convex rationality
function (because it extends the region in which the ap-
proximation (10) holds), whereas the analytic estimate is
poor for the concave case (due to the opposite effect).
Making use of Eq. (12) Fig. 2(b) shows the depen-
dence of the Nash-LQRE divergence as a function of the
number of hubs in the core-periphery network. We can
understand the dependence by noting the two compet-
ing factors in equation (12). With increasing numbers
of hubs, the number of edges in the core increases which
tends to lower the average divergence. On the other hand
in a finite graph, an increasing number of hubs leads to a
decrease of the average degree of a hub, which makes hubs
less rational, and so the divergence tends to increase. For
a graph with N = 1000 nodes and M = 2000 edges the
minimum of (12) is obtained in the neighbourhood of 12
hubs, in good agreement with the numerical optimisation
in Fig. 2(a) that tends toward a graph with 13 hubs.
As Table II shows, the results for the average diver-
gence of the core-periphery graph are notably smaller
than results obtained for all other topologies. Further-
more, it is easy to see that the core-periphery networks
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FIG. 3. (a) The evolution of −ρ, the average Jensen-Shannon divergence between Nash and LQR equilibria, for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (β = 1.33) with linear rationality, starting with an initially random network (N = 1000 nodes and M = 2000 edges)
as a function of the number of attempted edge rewirings, allowing isolated nodes. The optimisation reaches the theoretical
minimum (dashed line), which is achieved for a complete graph with 63 nodes. (b) Numerical (dots) and analytical (dashed
line) results for the divergence of regular graphs with M = 2000 edges in the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Analytic values
calculated according to equation (8).
lie at local minima (in the space of possible graphs) with
respect to the value of the Nash-LQRE divergence. This
can be seen by exploring the effects of possible rewirings.
Moving an edge that connects two nodes in the core (a
cc edge) to connect another two nodes in core does not
change the average divergence. Also, moving an edge
that connects a core node to a periphery node (a cp edge)
to connect another core-periphery pair has no effect. A
rewiring that does affect the divergence involves moving
an edge that lies between:
(a) two hubs, so that it connects a hub and a periphery
node, i.e., moving from a cc edge to a cp edge
(b) two hubs, so that it connects two periphery nodes,
i.e., moving from a cc edge to a pp edge
(c) a hub and a periphery node, so that it connects two
periphery nodes, i.e., moving from a cp edge to a
pp edge
Due to the high rationality of hub nodes, an edge be-
tween two hubs has a near zero contribution to the di-
vergence. The low degree nodes are associated with low
rationality, hence they will a have quantal response equi-
libria that differ significantly from the Nash equilibrium.
Hence, moving an edge that lies between two hubs so that
it now connects to one or two periphery nodes will lead
to an increase the in the average divergence.
Moving an edge that connects a hub and a periphery
node to connect two periphery nodes, will also lead to an
increase in the divergence, which we can quantify. After
rewiring an edge that connected a hub to the periphery
to now connect two periphery nodes, the divergence is:
−ρw '
(
1− K(K − 1)/2− 1
M
)(
µ+
p
(1)
h ln 2 + p
(1)
f ln 3
2
)
− K(K − 1)
2M
ρc +
1
M
pd+1 ln 2
+
1
M
(
(1− pd+1) ln 1− pd+1
1− pd+1/2 + ln
1
1− pd+1/2
)
(13)
where pd+1 is the probability of cooperation for a node
in a regular graph of average degree d+ 1. If pd+1 ' 0.5,
then the last three terms are approximately 2µ/M , which
is larger than the term it is replacing that is approxi-
mately µ/M . Thus, −ρw ≥ −ρcp. In summary, any
rewiring either does not change the average divergence,
or increases it. So, the core-periphery topology achieves
a local minimum for the average divergence in the space
of possible graph topologies.
2. Stag Hunt
The results for the Stag Hunt game are largely anal-
ogous to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The payoff matrix
for the Stag Hunt is also in Table III. We have that
a1 = e
λ1 , b1 = e
−λ1β , a2 = eλ2 , b2 = e−λ2β and equa-
tions (1) take the form:
p1c(1 + e
λ1(1−βp2c)) = 1
p2c(1 + e
λ2(1−βp1c)) = 1
(14)
For a regular graph the equations reduce to:
pr(1 + e
λ(1−βpr)) = 1 (15)
7Game with
β = 1.33
Battle of the Sexes (−ρ× 102) Matching Pennies (−ρ× 102)
Graph type
Core-periphery
(K=1500)
Scale-free Random Regular
Core-periphery
(K=168)
Scale-free Random Regular
Linear 0.178 2.9(3) 0.25(1) 0.236 0.096 0.47(3) 0.215(1) 0.218
Convex 0.458 1.0(4) 0.473(1) 0.486 0.230 0.8(3) 0.252(1) 0.252
Concave 0.180 1.1(1) 0.200(1) 0.202 0.142 0.26(1) 0.200(1) 0.203
TABLE IV. The average Nash-LQRE divergence (−ρ) in the case of the Battle of the Sexes and Matching Pennies games
for the different network topologies and different choices of rationality functions. The numerical results for the scale-free and
random networks are averaged over 100 instances. The core-periphery nodes have K hubs.
Applying Eq. (8) for the average divergence of a regu-
lar graph to the solution of (15) again matches with the
numerical computations in Table II.
If λh is large and λf is small then we can approximate
to zero order ph = 0 and pf = 1/(1+e
λf ). If β < 1+eλ2 ,
then the first order approximations are:
ph =
1
1 + e(λh(1−β/(1+e
λf )))
' e−λ1(1−β/(1+eλf ))
pf =
1
1 + eλf (1−βph)
' 1
2(1− λf (1− βph)/2)
' 1
2
− λf (1− βph)
4
(16)
The optimum network that minimises −ρ is a core-
periphery network with K = 18 hubs that form a com-
plete subgraph. For linear rationality, equation (12) gives
an average divergence of −ρcp = 0.1485 which is in rea-
sonable agreement with the numerical calculation in Ta-
ble II, while a close match is found for convex rationality.
A large difference is observed between the numerical re-
sult and analytic estimate for the concave case, due to
the square root function decreasing the rationality of the
hubs and, thus, approximation (16) failing.
Above we have considered rewirings in which isolated
nodes were prevented. However, the observation of the
emergence of a strong core-periphery structure makes one
wonder if optimal networks would actually become dis-
connected when this constraint is removed. Hence, we
consider again the Prisoner’s Dilemma and relax the op-
timisation conditions in the rewiring of the network to
allow for isolated nodes. Figure 3(a) shows the results of
a variant of simulated annealing performed to optimise
the network. The numerical results indicate that a ma-
jority of nodes become isolated and a certain number of
hub nodes end up sharing the edges between them. If
we approximate the remaining sub-graph of hubs as a
complete graph, then the number of hubs is given by
K =
1 +
√
1 + 8M
2
(17)
The average divergence for a complete graph with K
nodes is given by equation (8) for a regular graph when
BS P1 MP P1
P2
β, 1 0, 0
P2
β, 0 0, 1
0, 0 1, β 0, 1 1, 0
TABLE V. Payoffs for the Battle of the Sexes (BS) and
Matching Pennies (MP) games.
the average degree is K. For M = 2000 the number of
hubs is K = 63 and gives a divergence of −ρ = 0.197,
which matches with the numerical optimisation in Fig.
3(a). Of all regular graphs with M = 2000 edges the
complete graph with 63 nodes has minimum divergence,
which is indicated in Fig. 3(b). For the Stag Hunt game
the unconstrained optimisation leads to regular graph
with N = 400 nodes and average degree 2M/N = 10.
B. Asymmetric games
1. Battle of the Sexes
We now consider the asymmetric games: the Battle of
the Sexes and the Matching Pennies, with payoffs given
in Table V. In the cases of these two games we compute
the average Nash-LQRE divergence with respect to the
mixed strategy Nash equilibria. For the Battle of the
Sexes, we find that the average divergence with respect to
the mixed Nash equilibrium, Q1 = (β/(1 +β), 1/(1 +β))
and Q2 = 1−Q1, is much closer to zero than for the pure
strategy Q1 = Q2 = (0, 1). In the case of the Matching
Pennies games, there is no pure Nash equilibrium.
We first analyse the Battle of the Sexes for which
a1 = e
λ1 , b1 = e
−λ1(1+β), a2 = eλ2β , b2 = e−λ2(1+β).
Equations (1) take the form:
p1c(1 + e
λ1(1−(1+β)p2c)) = 1
p2c(1 + e
λ2(β−(1+β)p1c)) = 1
(18)
As equations (18) are not symmetric when exchanging
players, the game is played twice on each edge, once solv-
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FIG. 4. (a) The evolution of −ρ, the average Jensen-Shannon divergence between Nash and LQR equilibria, for the Battles of
the Sexes (thin line) and Matching Pennies (thick line) (β = 1.33) with linear rationality, in the range of topologies between an
initially random network (N = 1000 nodes and M = 2000 edges) as a function of attempted edge rewirings, while not allowing
isolated nodes. The optimisations reaches the estimated minima (dashed lines). (b) The divergence for regular graphs with
M = 2000 edges in the case of the Battle of the Sexes (triangular dots) and Matching Pennies (square dots), with analytic
results shown by dashed lines.
ing equations (1) with the rationalities (λ1, λ2), and once
with the rationalities interchanged, i.e, (λ2, λ1).
If λ1 and λ2 are small then we can approximate to
zero order and obtain p1c = 1/2 and p
2
c = 1/2. The
approximations to first order are given by:
p1c =
1
1 + e
λ1(1−β)
2
' 1
2
(
1 + λ1(1−β)4
) ' 1
2
+
λ1(β − 1)
8
p2c =
1
1 + e
λ2(β−1)
2
' 1
2
(
1 + λ2(β−1)4
) ' 1
2
− λ2(β − 1)
8
(19)
The average divergence for different topologies is found
in Table IV. By optimising the network topology to min-
imise −ρ, as we did for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, we
obtain the results in Fig. 4. The divergence is minimised
for a core-periphery network where the core consist of
N/2 = 500 nodes that form a regular graph, and each
node in the core links to a single periphery node. The
degree of a node in the core is dh = 7, while in the periph-
ery it is df = 1. A qualitative illustration of the network
topology can be seen in Fig. 1(b).
If we optimise the network topology to minimise the
divergence with respect to the pure strategy Nash equi-
librium Q1 = Q2 = (0, 1), we obtain a regular graph of
average degree 2M/N = 4 and −ρ = 2µ = 0.432 for all
rationality functions. As Table IV shows, optimising with
respect to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium gives a
much lower value for the average divergence −ρ, which
is why we focus on this case.
We can gain analytic insight into the results presented
in Table IV by writing the average divergence as:
− ρ = α(−ρc) + (1− α)(−ρf ) (20)
where −ρc is the average divergence of the core, i.e., that
of a regular graph with average degree dh = 7, and −ρf
is the average divergence of the periphery, i.e., the diver-
gence for an edge connecting a degree df = 1 node with
a node from the core. The value of α is the fraction of
links that exist within the subgraph containing the core.
Hence, α = N(dh − 1)/(2M) = 75%. The rest of the
links are part of the periphery. By numerically solving
for the cooperation probabilities in (18) and using equa-
tion (20), we obtain an exact match to the numerically
obtained entries in Table IV.
If we allow isolated nodes to form throughout the op-
timisation then, similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
Stag Hunt games, the periphery nodes disconnect from
the network but now a core with a strongly bi-modal de-
gree distribution emerges. The core has Nc1 = 263 nodes
with degree dh1 ' 8, and Nc2 = 159 nodes with degree
dh2 ' 12. The average divergence is approximated well
by (20), where the two contributions come from regular
graphs with Nc1, Nc2 nodes with average degrees 8 and,
respectively, 12. Numerical and analytic results for reg-
ular graphs for the asymmetric games we consider are
shown in Fig. 4(b).
2. Matching Pennies
Finally, we consider the Matching Pennies game with
the more general payoff matrix shown in Table V. In the
case of the Matching Pennies we have that a1 = e
λ1 , b1 =
e−λ1(1+β), a2 = e−λ2 , b2 = e2λ2 and equations (1) take
the form:
p1c(1 + e
λ1(1−(1+β)p2c)) = 1
p2c(1 + e
λ2(−1+2p1c)) = 1
(21)
9Equations (21) are again not symmetric when exchang-
ing players and so the game is played twice on each edge,
as also done for the Battle of the Sexes. We can approxi-
mate the probabilities for strategy choice C to zero order
by p1c = p
2
c = 0.5. If the rationalities are small then we
can make the following first order approximations:
p1c '
1
2
+
λ1(β − 1)
8
p2c '
1
2
− λ1λ2(β − 1)
16
(22)
Table IV gives figures for the average divergence for
different topologies and rationality functions, while Fig.
4(a) shows the results obtained numerically from an op-
timisation procedure to minimise −ρ. The results are
largely analogous to the Battle of Sexes, with one ex-
ception: The core-periphery graph that minimises the
divergence has a core consisting of a quasi-regular graph,
with Nc = 168 nodes with average degree dh ' 19, and
the periphery nodes form (N − Nc)/2 = 416 pairs (K2
graphs) completely disconnected from the core. Equation
(20) can be applied with α = Ncdh/(2M) ' 80%, and
the results match with the entries in Table IV. If we al-
low isolated nodes to form during the optimisation, then
the optimal network structure that minimises the average
divergence is a quasi-regular graph with Nc = 168 and
average degree dh ' 24. Hence, the core in both types of
optimisation for the Matching Pennies game has the same
number of nodes; it is only the number of edges within
the core that varies due to the connectivity constraint.
IV. CONCLUSION
Previous work has proposed that scale-free networks
maximise the overall ”rationality” of a networked system
of players [21]. Here we have shown that for the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game core-periphery graphs, composed
of a core of connected hub nodes which each link to a
single periphery node, have a significantly lower average
Nash-LQRE divergence than scale-free networks. This
result is supported by numerical experiments and also
by an analytic approximation for the divergence of core-
periphery graphs that reproduces numerical results well
for all the different rationality functions considered. The
accuracy of the analytic results can decrease due to the
fact that in finite core-periphery graphs the hubs will al-
ways have a finite degree, and hence the approximations
suffer. If no connectivity constraint is enforced during
optimisation, optimal networks are found to consist of a
core made up by a complete graph with all other nodes
being isolated.
For the Stag Hunt game, an analogous analytic treat-
ment of the connectivity constrained case yields quali-
tatively similar results to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, while
the connectivity unconstrained optimisation leads to a
regular graph.
Further, in contrast to [21], we have demonstrated
that highly heterogeneous degree distributions do not
necessarily maximise system rationality for all classes
of games. Analytic and simulation results show that,
for the Battle of the Sexes and the Matching Pennies
games, core-periphery graphs with cores that have a
quasi-regular topology minimise the average Nash-LQRE
divergence. If the connectivity of the network is not con-
strained in the optimisation procedure, then in the case of
the Battle of the Sexes a graph with a strongly bi-modal
degree distribution emerges, while for the Matching Pen-
nies game we obtain a quasi-regular graph.
We can interpret the results for the Prisoners Dilemma
or Stag Hunt games in a broader way. Cooperation is
naturally associated with altruistic behaviour, whereas
defection can be seen as a selfish course of action. Max-
imising system rationality, or minimising the difference
between the probability distributions and the Nash equi-
libria, can thus be interpreted as promoting selfish be-
haviour within the system. The topology that emerges is
one where a core consisting of roughly 1% of the nodes
in the network are part of over 90% of the connections
available, whereas each periphery node is as poorly con-
nected as possible. If higher numbers of a node in a
social network translates into greater influence/wealth,
then we see that by maximising selfishness in a social net-
work most of the power ends up concentrated in a very
small set of players. This result echoes present concerns
regarding wealth inequality, and furthermore, a similar
core-periphery structure has been found to underlie the
network of global corporate control, wherein a “large por-
tion of control flows to a small tightly-knit core of finan-
cial institutions” [28]. Our results elaborate a possible
mechanism for the emergence of such highly concentrated
core-periphery structures in social networks.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported by an EPSRC Doctoral
Training Centre Grant (EP/G03690X/1). No new data
was collected by this research.
10
[1] J.B. Cardell, C.C. Hitt, and W.W. Hogan. Market power
and strategic interaction in electricity networks. Resource
and energy economics, 19:109–137, 1997.
[2] M.A. Nowak and K. Sigmund. Evolutionary dynamics of
biological games. Science, 303:793–799, 2004.
[3] B.B. De Mesquita. Game theory, political economy, and
the evolving study of war and peace. American Political
Science Review, 100:637–642, 2006.
[4] J. F. Nash. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci., 36:48–49, 1950.
[5] E. J. Nell and K. Errouaki. Rational econometric man:
transforming structural econometrics. Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, UK, 2013.
[6] R. D. McKelvey and T. R. Palfrey. Quantal response
equilibria for normal form games. Game. Econ. Behav.,
10:6–38, 1995.
[7] R.D. Luce. Individual choice behavior: A theoretical anal-
ysis. Dover, Mineola, NY, 2005.
[8] J. Ochs. Games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria:
An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior,
10:202–217, 1995.
[9] J. K. Goeree, C. A. Holt, and T. R. Palfrey. Quantal re-
sponse equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auc-
tions. Journal of Economic Theory, 104:247–272, 2002.
[10] A. Enriqueta and R. P. Thomas. The effect of candidate
quality on electoral equilibrium: An experimental study.
The American Political Science Review, 98:77–90, 2004.
[11] R. D. McKelvey and J. W. Patty. A theory of voting
in large elections. Games and Economic Behavior, 57:
155–180, 2006.
[12] B. W. Rogers, T. R. Palfrey, and C. F. Camerer. Hetero-
geneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hi-
erarchies. Journal of Economic Theory, 144:1440–1467,
2009.
[13] S. Choi, D. Gale, and S. Kariv. Social learning in net-
works: a quantal response equilibrium analysis of exper-
imental data. Review of Economic Design, 16:135–157,
2012.
[14] M. A. Nowak and R. M. May. Evolutionary games and
spatial chaos. Nature, 359:826–829, 1992.
[15] G. Szabo´ and I. Borsos. Evolutionary potential games on
lattices. Physics Reports, 624:1–60, 2016.
[16] G. Szabo´ and G. Fath. Evolutionary games on graphs.
Physics reports, 446:97–216, 2007.
[17] M. Perc, J. Go´mez-Garden˜es, A. Szolnoki, L.M. Flora,
and Y. Moreno. Evolutionary dynamics of group inter-
actions on structured populations: a review. Journal of
The Royal Society Interface, 10, 2013.
[18] F. C. Santos and J. M. Pacheco. Scale-free networks
provide a unifying framework for the emergence of coop-
eration. Phys. Rev. Lett., 95:098104, 2005.
[19] M.G. Zimmermann, V.M. Eguluz, and M. San Miguel.
Coevolution of dynamical states and interactions in dy-
namic networks. Physical Review E, 69:065102, 2004.
[20] A. Szolnoki, M. Perc, and Z. Danku. Making new con-
nections towards cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma
game. EPL, 84:50007, 2008.
[21] D. Kasthurirathna and M. Piraveenan. Emergence of
scale-free characteristics in socio-ecological systems with
bounded rationality. Nature Scientific reports, 5:10448,
2015.
[22] D. Kasthurirathna, M. Piraveenan, and S. Uddin. Model-
ing networked systems using the topologically distributed
bounded rationality framework. Complexity, 21:123–137,
2016.
[23] D. Kasthurirathna, M. Harre´, and M. Piraveenan. Opti-
mising influence in social networks using bounded ratio-
nality models. Social Network Analysis and Mining, 6:
54, 2016.
[24] L. Li, D. Alderson, J. C. Doyle, and W. Willinger. To-
wards a theory of scale-free graphs: Definition, proper-
ties, and implications. Internet Mathematics, 2:431–523,
2005.
[25] M. Brede. Coordinated and uncoordinated optimization
of networks. Physical Review E, 81:066104, 2010.
[26] M Brede. Optimal synchronization in space. Physical
Review E, 81:025202, 2010.
[27] A.L. Baraba´si and R. Albert. Emergence of scaling in
random networks. Science, 286:509–512, 1999.
[28] S. Vitali, J. B. Glattfelder, and S. Battiston. The network
of global corporate control. PloS one, 6:e25995, 2011.
